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Construction. Several cases decided during the survey period illustrate
the importance of describing clearly the estate intended to be left to a ben-
eficiary. For instance, in Roberdeau v. Jackson' the testatrix's will pro-
vided that upon the death of her half-sister, "my nieces, . . . share and
share alike, shall then be entitled to life estates in all of my property, and
upon their deaths it is to then go to the child or children, share and share
alike, of my said nieces." 2 Two nieces, Eugenia and Beatrice, survived the
testatrix. Beatrice subsequently died survived by a daughter. Eugenia
contended that the above language created a joint tenancy in a life estate
with a right of survivorship in the surviving niece. The court noted that a
joint estate with a right of survivorship must be created by express lan-
guage,3 and held that the "share and share alike" language of testatrix's
will was insufficient to create a right of survivorship. Accordingly, the
daughter of the deceased niece received a vested one-half remainder in fee.
Zint v. Crofton4 involved the construction of a will that provided that the
residue of testatrix's property was to pass to her son, "with personal in-
structions to him for my four grandchildren," and "instead of creating a
trust herein for my four grandchildren, I have given instructions to my
beloved son . . . as to the inheritance that my grandchildren are to re-
ceive." 5 The court held that the "personal instructions" did not operate to
limit the devise of the residue of the estate to the son. The court relied on
the "first taker" rule, which favors that construction of the will that vests
the largest estate possible in the first taker. Under this rule the testator is
presumed to have intended a full disposition of all his estate rather than to
die partially intestate.6
The presumption of the "first taker" rule against partial intestacy was
* B.S.C., Southern Methodist University; M.B.A., J.D., Northwestern University;
S.J.D., Harvard University. Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
1. 565 S.W.2d 98 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, no writ).
2. Id. at 99.
3. The court relied on Chandler v. Kountze, 130 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galves-
ton 1939, writ ref'd), which held that express language of a deed could create a joint tenancy
with right of survivorship only when it is the clearly expressed intention of the grantor.
4. 563 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
5. Id. at 288-89.
6. See Rogers v. Nixon, 275 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1955, writ
ref'd); McDowell v. Harris, 107 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1937, writ dism'd). See
also Smith v. Bynum, 558 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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rebutted in Swearingen v. Giles.7 In Swearingen the court concluded that
absent a clear and unambiguous direction to the contrary, the death of a
residuary legatee prior to the testator caused that legatee's portion of the
estate to pass to the testatrix's heirs-at-law rather than to the remaining
residuary beneficiaries. Similarly, in Najvar v. Vasek8 there was no clear
direction that the children of the testator's brother should succeed to their
father's share if he predeceased the testator; hence, the property passed to
the testator's own children as his heirs-at-law.
Probate Code section 69 provides that all provisions relating to a di-
vorced spouse shall be null and void.9 In Calloway v. Estate of Gasser"°
the testatrix's will provided that her estate would pass to her husband if he
survived her, but if he failed to survive her, to certain designated benefi-
ciaries. The testatrix and her husband were divorced subsequent to the
execution of the will. In construing the testatrix's will the court held that a
divorced husband should be treated as a deceased husband for purposes of
determining the interests of contingent beneficiaries who were entitled to
succeed to the husband's interest if he predeceased the testatrix.
In First United Methodist Church v. Allen" the court construed the same
will reported last year in Moore v. Allen. 2 The testatrix bequeathed her
home to a church, but in a codicil recited: "I have willed my home to First
Methodist Church, but I want them to let L.D. Moore buy it for
$10,000.00.""3 Emphasizing the context of the will and codicil, the court
determined that the word "want" was mandatory and not precatory in
meaning.
In Warren v. Hartnett4 an obviously illiterate testatrix executed a ho-
lographic will reciting two events yet to occur: having her teeth pulled and
a plane trip to San Antonio. Contestants contended that the will was con-
tingent upon her death occurring as a result of either of the two events, and
that because neither event resulted in the testatrix's death, the will was
ineffective. The court noted that leaving a will implies an intent not to die
intestate and that if two constructions are possible, the one preventing in-
testacy should be applied.' 5 Accordingly, the recitals were construed as
reasons for making the will, but not conditions determining its effective-
ness. 16
7. 565 S.W.2d 574 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
8. 564 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1978, no writ).
9. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 69 (Vernon 1956).
10. 558 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ refd n.r.e.); cf McFarlen v.
McFarlen, 536 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1976, no writ) (divorced wife is not
treated as deceased, thus estate descended to heirs); Volkmer v. Chase, 354 S.W.2d 611 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston fist Dist.] 1962, writ refd n.r.e.) (divorced wife is not treated as de-
ceased).
II. 557 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
12. 544 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ); see Galvin, Wills and Trusts,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 32 Sw. LJ. 15, 16 (1978).
13. 557 S.W.2d at 177.
14. 561 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
15. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 121 Tex. 119, 45 S.W.2d 1096 (1932).
16. An issue of testamentary capacity was raised by opponents of the will. It was re-
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Testamentary Capacity. McIntyre v. Milliorn17 held that the state of the
decedent's mind must be determined as of the date of the execution of the
instrument offered for probate and not on some other date.' 8 Testimony
concerning the decedent's testamentary capacity on a date other than that
on which the will was executed, therefore, was properly excluded by the
probate court. In Wysick v. Estate of Wysick' 9 the trial court's instructions
on the elements of testamentary capacity were held sufficient despite its
failure to provide a definition of the words "next of kin and the natural
objects of her bounty."2 The court reasoned that the instructions were
substantially the same as had been previously approved by courts in Texas.
Execution and Proof. In will contests the Dead Man's Statute2' may pre-
vent the introduction of testimony concerning an instrument offered for
probate as the last will of a deceased person. In Adams v. Barry22 the
Supreme Court of Texas considered whether testimony offered in support
of the probate of an alleged lost will was excluded by the statute. The
testator died in 1973, and a will executed by him in 1968 was admitted to
probate. Thereafter, one Barry sued to set aside the 1968 will. She con-
tended that there was a lost will executed in 1972 that named her as the
sole beneficiary. The only evidence offered was Barry's testimony that she
and the testator executed reciprocal wills simultaneously. This testimony
was excluded. The court of civil appeals reversed and remanded, reason-
ing that the excluded testimony did not involve a transaction with the de-
ceased and hence was not prohibited by the Dead Man's Statute.23 The
Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of civil appeals, stating that the
"term 'transaction' involves mutuality or concert of action" and that
"whatever knowledge Miss Barry possessed with respect to the alleged lost
will of George Adams was inseparably connected with the transaction be-
tween them."24 Thus, the court held that Miss Barry's testimony to the
effect that there was a will that she saw and that was signed by Adams was
testimony regarding a transaction with the deceased barred by the Dead
Man's Statute.
In Moss/er v. Johnson25 two adopted children of Candace Mossler
sought to probate an instrument purported to be their mother's last will.
solved, however, in favor of the proponents when the court refused to allow testimony of
contestant's handwriting expert regarding decedent's mental condition.
17. 566 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, no writ).
18. Id. at 676. The court relied on Lee v. Lee, 424 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. 1968).
19. 562 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, no writ).
20. Id. at 904.
21. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3716 (Vernon 1926).
22. 560 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. 1978).
23. Barry v. Adams, 551 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, writ granted). The
court of civil appeals stated: "Article 3716 does not disqualify a witness from testifying to
facts that such witness may know of her own knowledge .... In the case at bar, Mrs.
Barry's testimony in question was based on her own knowledge, received from her reading
of the will of George H. Adams ... " Id. at 793-94.
24. 560 S.W.2d at 938.
25. 565 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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They were opposed by two natural children, Rita and Norman. Rita testi-
fied that a conformed copy of a will executed in 1968 was delivered to
Candace Mossier in the hospital. The testatrix struck the name of the ex-
ecutor and asked Rita to substitute the names of the two natural children.
The attending physician witnessed the changes made in the instrument.
The fatal flaw was that Rita filled in her name as an executrix and not as a
witness, leaving the doctor as the only witness. The will, therefore, was not
executed pursuant to Texas Probate Code section 59 and could not be ad-
mitted to probate.
In Pelton v. Dawley26 a holographic will, admittedly in the handwriting
of deceased, was denied probate because it could not be read. The court
held that when words are so illegible as to allow only speculative deci-
phering by the court the writing fails as a testamentary instrument.
Joint and Mutual Wills. Two individuals executing the same document as
their joint will do not necessarily bind one another to the terms of the
instrument unless they have contractually agreed to do so. The Texas Pro-
bate Code permits the survivor to revoke the prior will, but he or she does
so under peril of an action for breach of contract arising out of the earlier
instrument. Jones v. Chamberlain27 is illustrative of this problem. In 1962
R.L. and his wife, Pearl, executed a joint will. R.L. died in 1969, and on
application of Pearl the 1962 will was admitted to probate. In 1975 Pearl
executed a new will, revoking the joint will. Pearl died in 1975, and a
contest arose between the beneficiaries under the 1962 will and those
under the 1975 will. The district court found that the 1962 will was joint
and contractual and refused to admit the 1975 will to probate. On appeal,
the court of civil appeals reversed the judgment of the district court and
admitted the 1975 will to probate. The court reasoned that the 1975 will
was valid in all respects as a revocation of the 1962 will and, therefore,
should be admitted to probate. Further, the beneficiaries under the 1962
will were without prejudice to file suit for breach of contract arising out of
the 1962 will.28 This case presents an anomalous result in that the propo-
nents of the 1975 will were successful in having that instrument admitted
to probate, yet the beneficiaries under the 1962 will may in the final analy-
sis take the properties in the estate in satisfaction of their contractual
claims.
Steam v. Reass2 9 presented a similar situation. The testator and testatrix
executed a joint will disposing of all of their property. The will included
an agreement that the joint will would remain unrevoked after the death of
the first to die. The court upheld the joint will and imposed a constructive
26. 556 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Civ. App.--Waco 1977, no writ).
27. 563 S.W.2d 885 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, no writ).
28. See Tips v. Yancey, 431 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. 1968); Nesbett v. Nesbett, 428 S.W.2d 663
(Tex. 1968).
29. 559 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, writ refd n.r.e.); see
Weidner v. Crowther, 157 Tex. 240, 301 S.W.2d 621 (1957); Murphy v. Slaton, 154 Tex. 35,
273 S.W.2d 588 (1954).
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trust on the properties in the hands of the surviving husband for the bene-
ficiaries under the will.
Family Settlement Agreement. In Womack v. Worthington30 a father left
his estate to one of three daughters. Another daughter sued to establish
that the three sisters had entered an oral agreement to divide the estate
equally. The agreement was allegedly entered into thirteen years before
the father's death. The court held that such an agreement was included
within the Statute of Frauds3' and, if it existed, was unenforceable.
Procedure. A series of cases dealt with procedural matters. Williams v.
Hollingsworth32 held that to abandon a will contest action all parties in-
volved in the dispute had to consent to a settlement. In Garrison v. Texas
Commerce Bank33 the court held that an order that granted a divorce but
that retained jurisdiction to divide community property was interlocutory.
In Garrison the testatrix died prior to a final judgment in her divorce ac-
tion. The surviving spouse of the testatrix brought an action contesting the
probate of his wife's will. The court found that the wife's death before
final judgment rendered the divorce action moot. The husband, therefore,
became an "interested person" in his spouse's estate and was entitled to be
a contestant of the probate of the will.
The independent executor in Sumaruk v. Todd34 brought suit to recover
$30,000 from the former nurse of the deceased, alleging that a stipend from
the deceased was a loan and not a gift. The district court ruled in favor of
the executor on a motion for summary judgment. The defendant ap-
pealed, contending that under section 5 of the Probate Code35 the statutory
probate court of Dallas County had exclusive jurisdiction of the matter.
The court of appeals disagreed, construing section 5 as permitting concur-
30. 561 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
31. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon 1968).
32. 568 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. 1978), rev'g and remanding 559 S.W.2d Ill (Tex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana 1977).
33. 560 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1977, writ refd n.r.e.). For a
similar situation, see Bourne v. Bourne, 559 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1977, no writ) (Divorce decree determined that wife should have an interest in a ring
that husband inherited from his grandmother. Held: divorce court had authority to deter-
mine ownership in ring although grandmother's estate was being administered in probate
court. This was without prejudice to grandmother's heirs to assert any interest that they
might have.).
34. 560 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, no writ).
35. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79). For additional recent cases
construing § 5, see Estate of Rosborough v. Daniels, 567 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana 1978, no writ) (contested claim against an estate is a probate matter and con-
testing party is a party to the proceedings who may have matter transferred to district court);
Nolan v. Bettis, 562 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, no writ) (jurisdiction of suit
for fraud and cancellation of deed was not exclusively vested in probate court, and district
court could entertain suit); Bell v. Hinkle, 562 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (suits to determine heirship are within the exclusive jurisdiction
of probate court; if administration not pending, district court has jurisdiction of trespass to
try title action); Estate of Maxey v. Sparks, 559 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (where county court proceeded first on heirship matter, its findings
were res judicata in district court).
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rent jurisdiction of the district and county courts in matters incident to an
estate. The court noted that section 5 was intended to give the probate
court exclusive jurisdiction only over matters in which the controlling issue
was the settlement, partition, or distribution of an estate.36 Here, no ad-
ministration was pending, and, therefore, the district court was properly
carrying out its historic general jurisdiction.
In Bergeron v. Sessions37 a receiver was appointed to marshal the assets
of a missing person until he was declared dead. Prior to the termination
and final accounting of the receivership, the district court awarded final
fees to the receiver and his accountant. On appeal it was held that the
award of final fees to the receiver before he finished his work was error,
that a receiver's fee was subject to the court's, but not the jury's, determi-
nation, and that it was error not to separate the value of legal services
performed by the receiver from his other services.
Kilgore v. Estate of Kilgore38 presents the not unusual situation in which
the independent executor of an estate becomes incapacitated and unable to
perform his duties. In Kilgore the independent executor was adjudged non
compos mentis, and a temporary administrator was appointed by the
court. The court of civil appeals reversed the action of the lower court. It
reasoned that Probate Code section 222,"9 which authorizes the removal of
a personal representative when he becomes an incompetent, does not apply
to independent executors.4 0 The result of this case may be avoided by pro-
viding specifically for successor executors in the event of disability of the
person appointed. Certainly, there is need for a clarifying amendment by
the Texas Legislature.
The lengthy litigation involving the estate of Sarita K. East was again
before the Supreme Court of Texas in Trevino v. Turcotte.4 In this will
contest action the contestants' father was both an independent executor of
the estate and a beneficiary under the contested will who had received and
accepted substantial benefits before his death. All of the contestants con-
tended that they were "interested persons" because they were the sole heirs
of their father who had a substantial interest in the East estate. Further,
two of the contestants claimed to be interested persons by virtue of assign-
36. See Schwartzel & Wilshusen, Texas Probate Jurisdiction. New Patchesfor the Texas
Probate Code, 54 TEXAS L. REV. 372 (1976).
37. 561 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref d n.r.e.). For a related case,
see Bergeron v. Sessions, 554 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ).
38. 568 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, no writ).
39. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 222 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
40. The court relied on Bell v. Still, 389 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1965),
adopted, 403 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. 1966), in which the court held that the Probate Code did not
alter the previously existing rule that a probate court did not have the power to remove an
independent executor unless he failed to post a bond when required to do so. In the instant
case Chief Justice Cadena filed a vigorous and well-reasoned dissent, arguing that removal
of an independent executor for legal incapacity to perform does not involve intrusion by the
probate court into the manner in which the independent executor is discharging his respon-
sibilities. Thus, such removal violates neither the letter nor the spirit of the Texas Supreme
Court's holding in Bell. 568 S.W.2d at 15 1.
41. 564 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. 1978).
[Vol. 33
WILLS AND TRUSTS
ments acquired from heirs of the testatrix. Addrgssing the arguments of
the contestants, the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the
lower courts that the contestants, as devisees or legatees of their father,
were estopped to challenge the validity of the will by their father's accept-
ance of benefits under the will. In addition, the court extended the rule of
estoppel to the contestants asserting claims under the minute interests ac-
quired from heirs of the testatrix. The court concluded that it would be
inequitable, unjust, and against public policy to permit standing under
such circumstances.
Slayton v. Slayton42 involved a plea of privilege. A widow in her indi-
vidual capacity and as representative of her husband's estate sued her de-
ceased husband's son by a former marriage on the grounds that the son
had defrauded her as to the value of the estate. The defendant filed a plea
of privilege to be sued in Harris County, the county of his residence. The
court held that the suit was properly brought by the widow in Jefferson
County, where it was alleged the fraudulent statements were made.
Equitable Conversion. In Fuqua v. Fuqua43 the deceased, prior to her
death, sold real property to a third party. The death of the deceased oc-
curred prior to the passage of legal title. The court of appeals sustained
the proposition that the interest passing is treated as personalty because the
proceeds are "related back" to the date the deed from the vendor was
placed in escrow.
II. TRUSTS
Construction. In Bradford v. Rain" a debtor, joined by a principal mortga-
gee, conveyed certain oil producing properties to a trustee under an agree-
ment that the trustee collect all income from the producing properties and
distribute the net collections on a pro rata basis among the creditors of the
debtor other than the mortgagee. Under the agreement the trustee was not
authorized to convey the properties to third parties as long as $25,000 per
month was made available for distribution among creditors. If, however,
such sum was not available, the trustee could sell the properties and dis-
tribute the proceeds among the creditors. If the creditors were satisfied out
of the income from the properties, then the trustee was to assign the
properties to the mortgagee. The trust agreement, however, was silent as
to what disposition the trustee should make if the proceeds of a sale ex-
ceeded the creditors' claims. The mortgagee brought a declaratory judg-
ment action, contending that it was the equitable owner of the property
under the trust agreement. The court of appeals agreed, construing the
42. 557 S.W.2d 538 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, no writ). See also Aleman v.
Laborers Nat'I Pension Fund, 558 S.W.2d 106 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, no writ) (venue
of suit to recover death benefits from a pension plan trust was proper in county where the
principal office of trust is maintained under TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7425b-24(B)
(Vernon 1960)).
43. 559 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd).
44. 562 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, no writ).
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instrument as vesting a remainder in the mortgagee subject to divestment
if the trustee exercised his power of sale under the provisions of the trust
instrument.
In Brelsford v. Scheltz45 a conveyance of land was made to "Michael
Scheltz, Trustee" in 1972 without a designation of trust powers or terms.
Michael wrote to his brother, Allan, stating that he held an undivided one-
half interest in the land as trustee for Allan. Allan subsequently conveyed
eight percent of his interest to a third party, and the third party sought a
partition. Reviewing the refusal of the trial court to partition, the court of
civil appeals held that a deed to one as trustee without terms or powers
fails to create an express trust.46 Therefore, neither Allan nor his assignees
had an equitable title that could be the basis for partition.
Burnett v. First National Bank47 involved two trusts established by a hus-
band and wife, one revocable and the other irrevocable. Both trust agree-
ments gave the trustee bank broad discretion over the trust and provided
that the trustee would not be liable for an honest mistake in judgment.
The bank as trustee of the irrevocable trust purchased certain notes from
itself as trustee of the revocable trust. Beneficiaries of the irrevocable trust
brought suit against the trustee alleging improper self-dealing and mis-
management. On the finding that there was no evidence of negligence or
bad faith, the court of civil appeals held that no material issue of fact ex-
isted as to whether the trustee was guilty of improper self-dealing or mis-
management because the trust agreement specifically allowed broad self-
dealing powers and exculpated the fiduciary for mistakes in judgment.48
In Pierson v. Palestine Contractors, Inc. " Palestine created a retirement
trust for its employees. The retirement trust purchased annuities for three
employees who terminated their employment. The annuities were issued
in the name of the trust. Subsequently, the employees brought suit to have
the trust transfer ownership of the policies to them. Although the trust
agreement contemplated that ownership of such annuities could be in
others than the trust, the question before the court was whether the non-
transferability provision precluded the trust from transferring ownership
of the annuity to the former employees. On review of the entire instru-
ment, the court held that the trust was not required to transfer ownership
of the annuities.
Revocation. In Weatherly v. Byrd ° the settlor of a revocable trust became
45. 564 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
46. A trust requires a settlor, a corpus, and a beneficiary. Unthank v. Reppstein, 386
S.W.2d 134 (Tex. 1964).
47. 567 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, writ refd n.r.e.); see Adam v. Harris,
564 S.W.2d 152 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
48. The draftsman is well advised to include an exculpatory clause holding the trustee
liable only for negligence or bad faith.
49. 559 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, writ ref d n.r.e.).
50. 566 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. 1978). The ward had died at the time of the appeal. The
guardian, therefore, contended that the action was moot. The court of civil appeals held that
the action was not moot because the settlor was alive when the trial court entered judgment
and the guardian required funds to make a final account. Weatherly v. Byrd, 552 S.W.2d
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incompetent. Her guardian filed a petition in the probate court to revoke
the trust. The Supreme Court of Texas held that the power of revocation
is a personal right. The guardian, therefore, could not revoke for her
ward.5'
Constructive Trust. In Roberts v. Roberts 2 a divorce decree provided that
the children of the divorced couple were to be the beneficiaries of policies
on their father's life. At the death of the father, however, the former wife
was designated a beneficiary of the policy. The insurance company filed
an interpleader to determine who should receive the proceeds of the pol-
icy. The court held that it was proper to impose a constructive trust on the
proceeds for the children's benefit.
In Rankin v. Naftalis5 3 the plaintiffs sought to impose a constructive
trust on an oil and gas lease that defendant took in his own name. The
defendant had a joint venture arrangement with the plaintiffs for the de-
velopment of a particular lease. The defendant subsequently acquired an
unrelated lease. The plaintiffs brought suit, contending that the defendant
was in a fiduciary relationship with them and, therefore, they were entitled
to share in the second lease. The court held that the fiduciary relationship
covered only the first lease, and any oral commitments that the defendant
made concerning the second lease were unenforceable under the Statute of
Frauds, Statute of Conveyances, and the Texas Trust Act. As a result, the
court refused to impose a constructive trust on the second lease for the
benefit of the plaintiffs.
Deeds of Trust. In Bozeman v. Foiott54 the decedent died testate in 1972
with a note in default to the National Bank of Commerce of Brownsville
secured by a deed of trust. His will was filed for probate in December 1973
and his wife was appointed independent executrix. The land subject to the
deed of trust was sold at a trustee sale in June 1973. In an action to cancel
the trustee's deed the court of civil appeals applied the rule that a trustee's
deed is valid if a decedent mortgagor dies testate, appointing an independ-
ent executor. If the estate had not been an independent administration, the
power of sale would have been suspended during administration.55
573 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, writ granted). Although one reason for the decision
was in the interest of judicial efficiency, the guardian must now presumably start over in the
district court.
51. The court further held that the district court, not the probate court, had jurisdiction
to resolve the controversy.
52. 560 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
53. 557 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. 1977). Other constructive trust cases decided during the sur-
vey period were Gutierrez v. Madero, 564 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1978, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Rogers v. Butler, 563 S.W.2d 840 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, writ refd
n.r.e.); Johnson v. Brown, 560 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Williams v. Williams, 559 S.W.2d 888 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ ref d n.r.e.); Austin
Lake Estates, Inc. v. Meyer, 557 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ); First
Nat'l Bank v. Sassine, 556 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. Civ. App.-no city] 1977, no writ).
54. 556 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref d n.r.e.); see Ham-
monds v. Holmes, 559 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. 1977).
55. Pearce v. Stokes, 155 Tex. 564, 291 S.W.2d 309 (1956).
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